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Abstract—A Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) is a form
of Mobile ad-hoc network, to provide communications among
nearby vehicles and between vehicles and nearby fixed roadside
equipment. The key operation in VANETs is the broadcast of
messages. Consequently, the vehicles need to make sure that the
information has been sent by an authentic node in the network.
VANETs present unique challenges such as high node mobil-
ity, real-time constraints, scalability, gradual deployment and
privacy. No existent technique addresses all these requirements.
In particular, both inter-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside wireless
communications present different characteristics that should be
taken into account when defining node authentication services.
That is exactly what is done in this paper, where the features
of inter-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communications are ana-
lyzed to propose differentiated services for node authentication,
according to privacy and efficiency needs.
Keywords. Authentication, Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network,
VANET
I. INTRODUCTION
A Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork (VANET) is a type of
Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) that is used to provide
communications between nearby vehicles, and between ve-
hicles and fixed infrastructure on the roadside. In particular,
communications between On-Board Units (OBUs) in vehicles
are referred to as Vehicle-TO-Vehicle (V2V) communications,
while communications between OBUs and Road-Side Units
(RSUs), which is fixed equipment on the road, are referred
to as Vehicle-TO-Infrastructure (V2I) and Infrastructure-TO-
Vehicle (I2V) communications (see Figure 1).
These networks may be seen as the most promising ap-
proach for future Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs)
because V2V and V2I communications will enable not only
the improvement of safety, efficiency and comfort in everyday
road travel (see Table I), but also the offer of other value-added
services such as commercial information or access to Internet.
Note that when we talk about improving efficiency of road
transport, in fact we are talking about reducing waste of time
and money, dependency on oil, environmental contamination,
environmental impact due to highway construction, etc.
The security of both types of wireless communications is
a necessary pre-requisite for the general adoption of VANET
technology. In order to achieve communication security, node
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Fig. 1. Types of communications in VANETs
authentication, which is the main topic of this paper, is the
most fundamental piece. However, authentication in such a
mobile environment poses a great privacy risk. In this paper
group formation is proposed as a strategy to strengthen privacy
and authentication, as well as to improve communication
efficiency in VANETs.
This work is organized as follows. Next section provides a
comparison between VANETs and MANETs. Section 3 gives
a brief background on VANETs. The following five sections
describe the group-based proposal and its differentiated node
authentication services. Finally, sections 9 and 10 conclude
the paper.
II. VANET VERSUS MANET
A VANET can be seen as a specific type of MANET, in
which the following characteristics appear [1]:
1) High node mobility.
2) Need for scalability of solutions due to the usual high
height of VANETs.
3) Nodes do not have restrictions on their power, processing
and storage capacities.
4) Need to consider the development scenarios (e.g. city or
highway).
In particular, among the characteristics indicated in [2] as
unique of VANETs, we want to remark the following ones:
• Frequent topology changes.
• Need of trust and real-time communication.
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Type of communication Requirement
Application One-hop Multihop Authentication Integrity Privacy
Intersection collision warning V2V No Yes Yes Yes
Emergency vehicle signal V2I and I2V Yes Yes Yes No
Work zone warning V2I and I2V Yes Yes Yes No
Forward collision warning V2V Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cooperative driving V2V Yes Yes Yes Yes
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF SAFETY APPLICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
• Confidentiality is not required when the information is
related to the safety.
• Need for privacy.
• Possible access to a fixed infrastructure along the road-
side.
• Existence of a central registry of vehicles, and periodic
contact with it.
• Qualified mechanisms for the exigency of the fulfillment
of the law.
On the other hand, when developing a VANET simulation,
some special characteristics of VANETs have to be considered:
• Each vehicle generally moves according to a road net-
work pattern and not at random like in MANETs.
• The movement patterns of vehicles are normally occa-
sional, that is to say, they stop, move, park, etc.
• Vehicles must follow speed limitations and traffic signals.
• The behavior of each vehicle depends on the one of its
neighbor vehicles as well as on the road type.
Despite the aforementioned differences, some security tools
designed for MANETs are nowadays being evaluated for their
possible application in VANETs [3]. That is the case of several
proposals described in this work.
As in MANETs, in VANETs who are in charge of package
routing are the vehicles themselves. In the bibliography, till
now several routing protocols for MANETs have been adapted
to VANETs following different approaches. Firstly, reactive
protocols designed for MANETs such as Ad hoc On-demand
Distance Vector (AODV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
have been adapted to VANETs. Nevertheless, simulation re-
sults do not indicate a good performance due to the highly
unstable routes. Consequently, we can conclude that those
adaptations might be successfully used only in small VANETs.
III. BACKGROUND ON VANETS
In the near future, VANETs will combine a variety of
wireless technologies like DSR (Dedicated Short Range) com-
munications described in the draft of standard for VANETs
IEEE 802.11p WAVE (Wireless for Access Vehicular Envi-
ronments), with Cellular, Satellite and WiMax technologies.
Therefore, it is expected that each vehicle will have as part
of its equipment: a black box (EDR, Event Data Recorder), a
registered identity (ELP, Electronic License Plate), a receiver
of a Global Navigation Satellite System like GPS (Global
Positioning System) or Galileo, sensors to detect obstacles at
a distance lesser than 200 ms, and some special device that
provides it with connectivity to an ad hoc network formed by
the vehicles. Such a device allows the node to receive and
send messages through the network.
Two hypotheses that are necessary to guarantee the security
of VANETs are that these devices are reliable and tamper-
proof, and that the information received through sensors is
also trustworthy. It is generally assumed that the messages sent
through the VANET may be digitally signed by the sender with
a public-key certificate. This certificate is generally emitted by
a Certification Authority (CA) that is admitted as reliable by
the whole network. The moments corresponding to vehicle
purchase and to the periodic technical inspections might be
respectively associated to the emission and renovation of its
public-key certificate.
Note that the use of PKIs in VANETs implies the problem of
the enormous cost of the management of a giant CA, with the
corresponding high consumption of resources. Furthermore, it
makes it very difficult to deal with anonymity. Since public
keys should be frequently updated in order to protect privacy,
it becomes impractical that all vehicles store the public keys
of the remaining nodes. Consequently, proposals such as self-
organized and distributed certification of public keys might
be good solutions. Note that any of these proposals must be
combined with a cooperation enforcement mechanism between
nodes.
IV. GROUPS
In this paper group formation is proposed as a valid strategy
to strengthen privacy and provide authentication, while reduc-
ing communications in VANETs. In particular, we propose
location-based group formation according to dynamic cells
dependent on the characteristics of the road, and especially
on the average speed. In this way, any vehicle that circulates
at such a speed will belong to the same group within its
trajectory. We also propose here that the leader of each group
be the vehicle that has belonged to the same group for the
longest time (see Figure 2).
According to our proposal, V2V between groups will imply
package routing from the receiving vehicle towards the leader
of the receiving group, who is in charge of broadcasting it to
the whole group if necessary. If the cells have a radio that
is greater than the wireless coverage of the OBU, the group
communication may be carried out by proactive Optimized
Link State Routing (OLSR).
In the two phases corresponding to group formation and
node joining, each new node has to authenticate itself to the
Fig. 2. Configuration of groups
leader through asymmetric authentication. Later, the leader
sends a shared secret key to it, encrypted with the public key
of the new node. In particular, this secret key is shared among
all the members of the group, and used both for V2V within
the group and for V2V between groups, as it is explained in
the following sections.
In this paper we propose the application of different cryp-
tographic primitives for node authentication, while paying
special attention to the efficiency of communications and to
the need of privacy. In this way, we distinguish four different
ways of authentication, which are analyzed in the following
sections:
• I2V
• V2I
• V2V inside groups
• V2V between groups
V. I2V AUTHENTICATION
Since privacy-preserving authentication is not necessary in
I2V, we propose for such a case the use of Identity-Based
Cryptography because it provides a way to avoid the difficult
public-key certificate management problem.
Identity-Based Cryptography is a type of public-key cryp-
tography in which the public key of a user is some unique
information about the identity of the user (e.g. the ELP
in VANETs). The first implementation of an Identity-Based
scheme was developed by Shamir in 1984 [4], which al-
lowed verifying digital signatures by using only public in-
formation such as the users’ identifier. A possible choice for
VANETs could be based on the modern schemes that include
Boneh/Franklin’s pairing-based encryption scheme [5], which
is an application of Weil pairing over elliptic curves and finite
fields.
VI. V2I AUTHENTICATION
Unlike I2V communication, in V2I communications privacy
is an essential ingredient. Here we propose a challenge-
response authentication protocol based on a secret-key ap-
proach where each valid user is assigned a random key-ring
with k keys drawn without replacement from a central key
pool of n keys [6].
According to the proposed scheme, during authentication
each user chooses at random a subset with c keys from its
key-ring, and uses them in a challenge-response scheme to
authenticate itself to the RSU in order to establish a session
key, which is sent encrypted under the RSU’s public key.
This scheme preserves user privacy due to the feature that
each symmetric key is with a high probability (related to
the birthday paradox and dependent on the specific choice of
parameters) shared by several vehicles.
When a vehicle wants to communicate with the RSU, it
sends an authentication request together with a set of c keys
taken at random from its key-ring and a timestamp. All this
information is then encrypted by the established session key.
Note that a set of keys, instead of only one key, is proposed for
authentication, because there is a high probability for the OBU
to have one key shared by a large amount of vehicles. This
makes it difficult to identify a possible malicious vehicle if just
one key is used. However, there is a much lower probability
that a set of a keys be shared by a large number of vehicles,
and so it is much easier to catch a malicious vehicle in the
proposal.
After the RSU gets the authentication request from the
vehicle, it creates a challenge message by encrypting a random
secret with the set of keys indicated in the request, by
using Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode. Upon receiving the
challenge, the vehicle decrypts the challenge with the chosen
keys and creates a response by encrypting the random secret
with the session key. Finally, the RSU verifies the response
and accepts the session key for the next communications with
the vehicle.
In the first step, in order to make easier the task of checking
the key subset indicated in the request by the RSU, we propose
a tree-based version where the central key pool of n keys
may be represented by a tree with c levels [7]. Each user is
associated to k/c leaves, and each edge represents a secret
key.
In this way, the key-ring of each user is formed by several
paths from the root to the leaves linked to it. During each
authentication process the user chooses at random one of its
paths, which may be shared by several users. In this way, to
check the keys, the RSU has to determine which first-level key
was used, then, it continues by determining which second-level
key was used but by searching only through those second-level
keys below the identified first-level key. This process continues
until all c keys are identified, what at the end implies a positive
and anonymous verification. The key point of this proposal is
that it implies that the RSU reduces considerably the search
space each time a vehicle is authenticated.
VII. V2V AUTHENTICATION INSIDE GROUPS
At the stages of group formation and group joining, each
new node has to authenticate itself to the group leader by using
public-key signatures [8].
After group formation or group joining, the group leader
sends a secret shared key to every new member of the group,
encrypted with the public key of this new node. Such a secret
group key is afterwards used for any communication within
the group both for node authentication and for secret-key
encryption if necessary (e.g. for commercial applications). In
this way, the efficiency of communications inside the group is
maximized because on the one hand certificate management is
avoided, and on the other hand, secret-key cryptography is in
general more efficient than public-key. Note that the use of a
shared secret key also contributes to the protection of privacy.
VIII. V2V AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN GROUPS
In order to protect privacy, group signatures are proposed
for node authentication between groups. A group signature
scheme is a method for allowing a member of a group to
anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group so that
everybody can verify such a signature with the public key of
the group. This group signature identifies the signer as a valid
member of the group and does not allow distinguishing among
different group members. This concept was first introduced by
Chaum and van Heyst in 1991 [9].
Essential for a group signature scheme is the group leader,
who is in charge of adding group members and has the ability
to reveal the original signer in the event of disputes. In our
proposal, the group leader issues a private key to each vehicle
within the group, which uniquely identifies each vehicle, and
at the same time allows it to compute a group signature and
prove its validity without revealing its identity. In this way, any
vehicle from any group will be able to communicate with any
vehicle belonging to other group anonymously. In particular,
our proposal for group signature is based on the cryptographic
primitive of bilinear pairings, which was also proposed for I2V
authentication.
IX. CONCLUSION
VANETs represent a challenge in the field of communi-
cations security, as well as a revolution for vehicular safety,
comfort and efficiency in road transport. In this paper we have
briefly described different services for node authentication in
VANETs, which depend on the participants in the process. For
I2V, since there is no need of privacy, Identity-Based cryptog-
raphy is proposed in order to avoid certificates management.
In the remaining cases, privacy is a must. In V2I we propose a
challenge-response authentication protocol that uses a secret-
key approach based on random key-trees. Such a proposal
provides an efficient solution for anonymous authentication,
especially if the branching factor at the first levels of the tree
is maximized.
In this work, groups are proposed as the most efficient way
to save communications. On the one hand, in order to provide
privacy between groups, we proposed group signatures. On the
other hand, for V2V inside groups, secret-key authentication
is the basis of the proposed solution.
Since this is a work in progress, a future version will include
many questions that have been left open here. Some of those
questions are the concrete definitions of each proposal, the
analysis of interactions among them, the comparison with
other previous solutions, and the implementation of the dif-
ferent schemes using free software NS-2 (Network Simulator
2).
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